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DISCOVERY AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

In 1951, Nebraska adopted the principal parts of Rules 26
to 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to depositions and discovery. These sections became Sections 25-1267.02 to
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25-1267.44 of the Nebraska statutes.1 Section 25-1267.02 provides
that the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not
privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. Also Sections 25-1267.38 and 25-1267.39, relating
to written interrogatories and discovery of documents, are limited
to discovery of matter not privileged.
Section 25-12062 provides that, "No ... physician, surgeon ...
shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any confidential
communications, properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the
functions of his office according to the usual course of practice of
discipline."
The purpose of this note is to examine the possibilities of obtaining a privileged communication to a physician before the trial
of an action for personal injuries.

I.

The Physician-Patient Privilege

There was no physician-patient privilege at common law. 3
Nebraska and thirty other states have enacted statutes extending
a privilege to confidential communications made to physicians.4
The policy behind these statutes is to encourage the patient to
discuss more freely his ailments with a doctor while knowing that
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1953).
Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1948).
a O'Brien v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 42 F.2d
48 (8th Cir. 1930); Friesen v. Reimer, 124 Neb. 620, 247 N.W. 561
(1933); Koskovich v. Rodestock, 107 Neb. 116, 185 N.W. 343 (1921);
Thrasher v. State, 92 Neb. 110, 138 N.W. 120 (1912).
4 Ariz. Code Ann. § 23-103 (1939); Ark. Stat. § 72-628 (1947); Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) § 1881 (1946); Colo. Rev. Stat. 153-1-7(4)
(1953); Idaho Code Ann.§ 9-203 (1947); Ind. Ann. Stat.§ 2-1714 (Burns
1933); Iowa Code Ann. § 622-10 (1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-2805
( 1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 213-200 (1953); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.911
(1938); l\linn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West 1945); Miss. Code Ann. § 1697
(1942); l\lo. Ann. Stat. § 491.060 (Vernon 1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 93-701-4 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1948); Nev. Comp.
Laws§ 89-74 (1929); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 20-112 (1941); N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act§ 352; N.C. Gen Stat. § 8-53 (1953); N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0106 (1943);
Ohio Gen. Code§ 2317.05 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 385 (1938);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.040 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28 § 328 (1938);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 273-45 (1938); S.D. Code § 36.0101 (1939); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-8 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.60 (1953); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 4992 (1949); Wis. Stat. § 325.21 (1947); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
§ 3-2602 (1945); South Carolina has the privilege by case decision. See
Cole's Next of Kin v. Anderson, 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908 (1939).
1
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such information will not be divulged to his humiliation or disgrace.5
Since the Nebraska physician-patient privilege extends only
to confidential communications which are necessary and proper to
enable the physician to discharge the functions of his office, an
examination of what medical testimony is encompassed by that
term is necessary.
The Nebraska courts have not restricted the word "communieations" to oral statements made by the patient to the doctor. In
O'Donnell v. O'Donnell6 the court held a hospital chart made by a
doctor while a patient was under his care for an operation was a
confidential communication. In Stapleton v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry.,'
an X-ray made of the patient's injured foot for the purpose of
ascertaining the extent of the injuries was held to be a confidental
communication. The court's syllabus stated:
When a party submits to an examination, or inspection by a physician, for the purpose of learning the state of his health or the
physical condition of any part of his anatomy, the knowledge thus
acquired by the physician is privileged, and the physician is not
permitted to testify to the condition he found, over objection based
upon the statute.

In Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America,8 it was held that the
physician's statements to the patient are privileged if based on
facts disclosed by the patient which are confidential communications.
Thus, it is seen that very important medical evidence concerning the physical condition of a plaintiff in a personal injury action is subject to the physician-patient privilege in Nebraska.
Whether the defendant may examine this evidence before the
trial by utilizing the discovery statutes has not been decided by
the Nebraska Supreme Court.

II.

Purposes Of The Discovery Statutes

Moore's Federal Practice9 points out the following benefits
of a liberal discovery procedure: (1) it is of great assistance in
ascertaining the truth and preventing perjury; (2) it is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and
5 Ansnes v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 665, 276 N.W. 397
(1937).
6142 Neb. 706, 7 N.W.2d 647 (1943).
7101 Neb. 201, 162 N.W. 644 (1917).
s 86 Neb. 372, 125 N.W. 621 (1910).
9 4 1\Ioore's Federal Practice 1014 (2d ed. 1950).
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sham claims and defenses; (3) it makes available in a simple,
convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could
not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes
not at all; (4) it educates the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defens es, thereby encouraging settlements out of court; ( 5) it expedites the disposal of litigation, saves
the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by
settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried;
( 6) it safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delay and
narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting
the trial; and (7) it facilitates both the preparation and the trial
of cases.
Ill.

Discovery Before Trial By Judicial Methods

Once the physician-patient privilege has been waived by the
patient, discovery will be permitted.10 Because of the 1925
amendment to Section 25-120711 by which the patient waives his
privilege if he offers evidence with reference to his " ... physical
or mental condition, or the alleged cause thereof ...." the privilege
will be waived in every trial for personal injury. In view of this
it is illogical to prevent defendant's discovery before trial of important medical evidence in a personal injury action by the unfortunate application of the physician-patient privilege designed
for an entirely different purpose. The purposes of the discovery
statutes are seriously hampered if the defendant is denied discovery of evidence which would be admitted at the trial.
In the absence of express waiver of the physician-patient
privilege by the plaintiff in a personal injury action, there are
judicial methods by which a defendant can obtain the medical
evidence before the trial. Assume that A has brought an action
in Nebraska against B for personal injuries received in an automobile accident as a result of B's negligence. B wishes to take
the deposition of A's physician, C, under Section 25-1267.0212 con10 Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
McKeever v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 99 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. ct. 1950);
Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949); rev'd on
other grounds, 257 Wis. 571, 44 N.W.2d 525 (1950); see also In re
Ericson's Will, 200 N.Y. l\Iisc. 1005, 106 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Surr. Ct. 1951)
where the court allowed examination of privileged hospital records after
waiver by personal representative of deceased.
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1207 (Reissue 1948).
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Any party
may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery•... "
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cerning C's treatment of A for a previous injury to A's back. He
also wishes to examine medical records, including X-rays, made by
C concerning that treatment under Section 25-1267.39. 13 A resists recovery on the grounds that the matter which B is seeking
to discover is privileged as a confidential communication to a
physician under Section 25-1206 .
.A.

IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE PHYSICI.AN-P.ATIENT PRIVILEGE

(1)

Doctrine of Implied Waiver in Other Jurisdictions

B can argue that A has impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege by bringing an action for personal injuries. In
Leusink v. O'Donnell,14 a Wisconsin case, the plaintiff brought an
action to recover for damages sustained in an automobile accident. Pursuant to a Wisconsin statute,15 the defendant insurance
company applied to the court for an order authorizing inspection
of certain hospital and medical reports. The plaintiff contended
that the records were privileged. The Wisconsin statute,1° providing for the physician-patient privilege, provided, "No physician
or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he may
have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character,
necessary to enable him to serve such patient except only ... (4)
with the express consent of the patient."

The court all°'ved the defendant to examine all medical records which concerned treatment of plaintiff's left arm and leg
before and after the accident because the plaintiff was suing for
impairment to those particular limbs. The court spoke in terms
of a duty on the part of the plaintiff to furnish information as to
the prior disability of his left arm and leg. The same result could
have been reached by holding that the plaintiff impliedly waived
his privilege by suing for injuries to his person.
B can also submit an interrogatory to A under Section 2513 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.39 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all
other parties, and subject to the provisions of section 25-1267.22, the
court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted by section 25-1267.02 and which are in his
possession, custody, or control. ... "
14 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949), rev'd on other grounds, 257
Wis. 571, 44 N.W.2d 525 (1950).
15 Wis. Stat. § 269.57 (1947).
16 Wis. Stat. § 325.21 (1947).
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1267.371 ; asking him if he had ever injured his back prior to the
accident. If A answers in the affirmative, B can argue that this
impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege.
In Munzer v. Swedish American Line,18 the plaintiff brought
an action against the defendant for alleged wrongful acts of the
defendant's agents occurring on board the defendant's ship. The
plaintiff claimed that she became violently ill and suffered a
mental and physical collapse, thereby becoming mentally unbalanced. Defendant attempted to obtain hospital records of a
mental hospital where plaintiff had been treated prior to the alleged incident by a subpoena duces tecum and also attempted to
examine the superintendents of those hospitals for the purpose of
discovery. Plaintiff resisted discovery by claiming that the testimony sought to be adduced and the records sought to be examined
were privileged and at no time had she expressly waived the privilege.
In determining whether there was a privilege, the federal
court applied the law of New York. The court held that the hospital records made by physicians attending a patient in a professional capacity were privileged. Section 354 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, 19 relating to waiver of the physician-patient
privilege provided, "The waivers herein provided for must be made
in open court, on the trial of the action or proceeding, and a
paper executed by a party prior to the trial providing for such
waiver shall be insufficient as such a waiver." However, the
court held that the plaintiff had impliedly waived her privilege
by stating that she had been insane and had been treated in mental hospitals prior to the alleged accident in answer to an interrogatory served on her under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Therefore, discovery was permitted. Sections 251267.37 and 25-1267.38 of the Nebraska statutes were adopted
from Rule 33 of the Federal Rules.
(2)

Doctrine of Implied Waiver in Nebraska

There are no Nebraska cases recognizing an implied waiver
of the physician-patient privilege. However, in Brown v. Brown20
the Nebraska court held that a testator impliedly waived the atI i Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.37 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Any party
may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered
by the party served .... "
Section 25-1267.38 provides, "Interrogatories
may relate to any matters, not privileged .... "
18 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
HI N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 354.
:w 77 Neb. 125, 108 N.W. 180 (1906).
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torney-client ])rivilege when he requested his attorney to sign as
an attesting witness to his will. Since the testator knew that an
attesting witness would have to testify as to his competency and
that the testimony of the attorney would be necessary for proof
of the testator's competency, the court reasoned that there had
·been an implied waiver of the privilege.
The implied waiver in the Brown case seems similar to an
implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege. In the previous
example A could make a full disclosure to his physician of his
physical condition at the time of treatment of his injuries without
fear of disclosure by C, his physician. The policy of the privilege
is fulfilled at this point. Similarly, the testator in the Brown case
would have had his communications with the attorney privileged
if he had not asked the attorney to sign as an attesting witness.
However, if A later decides to sue B for his injuries, A realizes,
because of Section 25-1207,21 he will waive the privilege and B will
be entitled to introduce any evidence of A's physical or mental
condition. Likewise, in the Brown case the testator realized that
if he asked the attorney to sign as an attesting witness, the privilege would be waived. A, like the testator in the Brown case, is
given a choice: (1) not suing and thus preserving his communication to C inviolate; or (2) suing and waiving the privilege.
The moment A files his petition there should be a waiver of
the privilege. If A will not be granted a privilege at the trial,
then there is no reason why he should have a privilege when B attempts to determine pre-trial information through the use of a
deposition.
B.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION

In the example, B could invoke Section 25-1267.4022 which
provides, "In an action in which the mental or physical condition
of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is
pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for
good cause shown and upon notice to be examined and to all other
parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and
scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it
is to be made."
This section was adopted from Rule 35 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Under the federal rules, A can obtain a copy
21 See note 11 supra.
22Neb. Rev. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1953).
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of this examination from the doctor who examined him.
Rule 35 (b) (2) provides:

But

By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so
ordered or by taking a deposition of the examiner, the party examined [A in the example] waives any privilege he may have in
that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may
thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical
condition.

So if A demands a copy of the medical report from the physician who examined him, he is deemed to have waived the privilege
as to the testimony of other physicians who will later examine
him or who have examined him in the past.
But the Nebraska legislature did not adopt Rule 35 (b) (2).
A will probably be entitled to obtain the Section 25-1267.40 report
by the use of the other discovery provisions. But even if A does
demand and receive the Section 25-1267.40 medical report, he does
not waive the privilege as to past and future medical examinations.
Of course B will always be entitled to the Section 25-1267.40 report. But he will not be entitled any other medical examination
reports of A, even though A has made a demand and received the
Section 25-1267.40 medical report, because these other medical
reports are shielded by A's privilege. 23
By employing Section 25-1267.40, B can discover A's physical
condition before the trial. However, this procedure is ineifective
for two reasons: (1) it is impossible to ascertain A's physical
condition prior to the accident and immediately after the accident,
and (2) time elapsing between the time of the accident and the
time of the physical examination vitiates its value. Therefore,
the use of Section 25-1267.40 does not solve B's difficulties.
C.

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

If B could remove the action filed against him to a federal
court on grounds of diversity of citizenship, he could argue that
the court is not bound by state laws on privilege and its waiver.
There is a split in the federal courts on the question of whether
the physician-patient privilege is a matter of substantive or procedural law. In Miller v. Pacific Mutual Life lnsiirance Comvany,2! the court held in a diversity action that the physician-patient privilege and waiver of the privilege were questions of substantive law and had to be determined by the law of Michigan.
23

2!

See note 31 infra.
116 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
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This case illustrates the view that the privilege is more akin to
state than to federal interests and therefore federal courts should
apply state law. 2:; However, other federal courts, following Moore's
view26 that the privilege is a procedural question, have held that
questions of the privilege are not controlled by the rule of E-rie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins. 27 Therefore, if the federal court
adopts Moore's view that the privilege is a procedural question,
B can ask the court to interpret the privilege, and to hold that the
privilege is impliedly waived by A bringing an action for personal
injuries.
D.

PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS:
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

In the example, assume that A's attorney asked a physician,
D, an expert in a specialized field of medicine, to examine A for
the sole purpose of helping A's attorney in the preparation of his
case, and that D submitted a report of his finding and his opinions based on those findings to A's attorney. B wishes to obtain
this report under Section 25-1267.39 of the Nebraska statutes.2 ''
This section forces A to produce documents for B's inspection,
copying, or photographing. But B may be confronted with a situation where the court will deny him discovery of D's report on
grounds other than the physician-patient privilege.
In San Francisco v. Superior Court, 29 the defendant sued for
a writ of mandamus to force the court to order a physician to
answer certain questions germane to the action. The information
sought was acquired by the plaintiff's physician who examined
the plaintiff for the purpose of aiding plaintiff's attorneys in the
preparation of their case. The court denied the defendant's writ
of mandamus on the grounds that the doctor's testimony was subject to the attorney-client privilege in that the doctor acted as
the attorney's agent to whom the client made communications.
There was no physician-patient privilege in this case because Section 188130 of the California Code provides for waiver of the privi25 Pugh, Rule 43 (a) and the Communication Privileged Under State
Law: An Analysis of Confusion, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 556 (1954).
26 Scourtes v. Albrect Grocery, 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Humphries v. Pennsylvania Ry., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Panella v.
Baltimore & 0. Ry., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28 See note 13 supra.
29 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
30 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) § 1881 (1946) provides, " ... provided further, that where any person brings an action to recover damages
for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute consent
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lege " ... where any person brings an action to recover damages
for personal injuries.... " Also the communications were made by
the plaintiff to the physician for the purposes of examination,
not treatment so there would be no privilege. Section 1881 of the
California Code states further, "a licensed physician or surgeon
can not ... be examined in a civil action, as to any information
acquired in attending the patient, which was necessary to prescribe or act for the patient...."
Granting that a communication made by a client to a bona
fide agent of any attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice is privileged, it seems an undue extension of the attorneyclient privilege to consider the physician in this case as the agent
of the attorney. It appears more like a back-handed method of
preventing discovery from an adverse party's expert. Most of
the courts have ignored the attorney-client privilege as the basis
for denying discovery, and have instead denied discovery on the
grounds that it was the plaintiff who paid the expert, not the
defendant. 31 Therefore, if B shows good cause, and can avoid the
"who paid the expert" factor, he may be allowed discovery of the
report submitted by D to A's attorney.

IV.

Legislative Action Pennitting Discovery Before Trial

In order to insure the fulfillment of the policy of the discovery statutes, legislation should be enacted which would definitely permit a defendant in a personal injury action to discover the
plaintiff's medical evidence before the trial. This result may be
accomplished in three ways: (1) amend the statutes on privilege
to include a waiver of the physician-patient privilege when an
action for personal injuries is commenced or (2) amena "he discovery statutes to permit discovery of matter subject to the physician-patient privilege in personal injury actions or (3) abolish the
physician-patient privilege.

by the person bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed
for or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said action
shall testify .... "

31 Sachs '" Aluminum Co. of American, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
affirming Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D.
425 (N.D. Ohio 1947); Cox v. Pennsylvania Ry., 9 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50
Col. L.R. 1026 (1950); 4 l\Ioore's Federal Practice 1152 (2d ed. 1950).
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AMENDING THE PRIVILEGE STATUTES

California,32 one of the jurisdictions having the physicianpatient-privilege, has a statute providing for a waiver when an
action for personal injuries is brought. In states, " ... where any
person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries,
such action shall be deemed to con...cditute con...qent by the per..."Jln
bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for
or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said
action shall testify...." The Model Code of Evidence33 in Rule
223 (3) has eliminated the privilege in actions for personal injuries. It states, "There is no privilege under Rule 221 [providing
for a physician-patient privilege] in an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense
of the patient or any party claiming through or under the patient...." Pennsylvania's privilege statute34 provides for an exception " ... in civil cases, brought by such patient, for damages
on account of personal injuries."
B.

AJ\IENDING THE STATUTES ON DISCOVERY

It would seem more wise to amend the discovery statutes and
provide for pre-trial discovery than to amend the privilege statute
and extend the waiver doctrine. The problem involved is more
germane to discovery than waiver. Waiver is a fiction which the
law invented to express a policy that a plaintiff bringing a personal injury action should not be allowed to withhold medical evidence of his physical condition which is essential to the defendant's case. By adopting the theory of waiver to allow discovery
before a trial, the legislature would be unnecessarily extending
this fiction into the field of discovery. Therefore, the problem
should be attacked directly by amending the discovery statutes.
C.

ABOLISHMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

It is obvious that if there were no physician-patient privilege,
discovery before trial of matter presently subject to the privilege

See note 30 supra.
:Model Code of Evidence, Rule 223(3) (1942).
34 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 328 (1938) provides, "No person authorized
to practice physics or surgery shall be allowed in any civil case, to disclose any information which he acquired in attending the patient in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient,
without consent of said patient, except in civil cases, brought by such
patient, for damages on account of personal injuries."
32
33
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would be permissible. There are sixteen states35 which do not
have the privilege-sixteen states which do not seem to be suffering from its absence. This fact would seem to cast some doubt on
the necessity for the privilege.

Conclusion
A literal interpretation of the Nebraska law on the physicianpatient-privilege and waiver of that privilege would appear to
hamper seriously the efficacy of those provisions in personal injury actions. However, Wisconsin and New York have invoked
the doctrine of implied waiver to permit discovery of privileged
matter by the defendant before the trial of the action. California
and Pennsylvania have express statutory provisions in their privilege statutes allowing discovery before the trial. Until legislative
action completely erases all doubt on the question of whether discovery of matter subject to the privilege will be allowed before
the trial of a personal injury action, courts should permit discovery through invocation of the "implied waiver" of the physician-patient privilege.
William H. Hein, '55

3~ Alabama. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
l\Iaine, i.\1aryland, l\1asschusetts, New Hampshire, Ne"· Jersey, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Vermont. South Carolina has the privilege by case
decision. See note 4 supra.

